Summary:
Paper investigating the relative performance of enterprises backed by government-sponsored venture capitalists and private venture capitalists. Results indicate that enterprises financed by government-sponsored venture capitalists underperform on a variety of criteria, including value-creation and innovation. Arises in part from a selection effect and in part from a treatment effect. Results cast doubt on the desirability of certain government interventions in the venture capital market. (Published: 05/08)
Notes:
- Only abstract; paper requires purchasing.
- Study focuses on a broader set of public policy objectives:
- value-creation, innovation, and competition
- Enterprises financed by government-sponsored venture capitalists underperform on a variety of criteria:
- value-creation: as measured by the likelihood and size of IPOs and M&As
- innovation: as measured by patents
- Cause 1: selection effect
- private venture capitalists have a higher quality threshold for investment than subsidized venture capitalists
- Cause 2: treatment effect
- subsidized venture capitalists crowd out private investment
- subsidized venture capitalists provide less effective mentoring and other value-added skills